University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 6
Number 1 October, 1975

Article 3

10-1975

Case Note: Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar - Lawyers
and the Free Enterprise System
Lindsay Schlottman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Schlottman, Lindsay (1975) "Case Note: Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar - Lawyers and the Free Enterprise System," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 6 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol6/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

lawyers and
The Free
Entetprise

System
by Lindsay Schlottman

In October 1971, Lewis and Ruth
Goldfarb wished to purchase a home in
Reston, Virginia. The lender who financed the purchase required the
Goldfarbs to obtain title insurance. A title
examination can only be performed by a
member of the State Bar in Virginia (all
Virginia attorneys are required to be
members of the State Bar). The
Goldfarbs discovered that all the attorneys they contacted charged exactly the
same fee for the title examination: the
fee established by the Fairfax County
Bar Association Minimum Fee
Schedule, which was closely modeled
after the State Bar's Schedule, and enforced by the State Bar Association. The
Goldfarbs never found a lawyer who
would charge a fee lower than the dictated fee; they therefore brought an individual and class action under the
Sherman Act** against the State Bar
and the County Bar alleging that restraint of trade or commerce results from
the establishment and enforcement of
minimum fee schedules. Goldfarb et al.,
v. Virginia State Bar, et 01., 355 F. Supp.
491 (1973); 497 F. 2d 1 (1974); 43 L.w.
4723 (June 16, 1975). (Two other
county bar associations were sued by the
Goldfarbs, but they agreed to a consent
judgment under which they cancelled
their fee schedules and were enjoined
from establishing fee schedules in the future).
The District Court found the State Bar

**The Sherman Act provides in part at 15 U.s.C. 1,
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwis~, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal ... "

not liable but the County Bar liable
under the Sherman Act. The basis of this
lia bility was found as follows: The District
Court stated that the mere existence of
the minimum fee schedule restricts
competition of attorneys by price fixing,
and that price fixing is one method of restraining trade prohibited by the Sherman Act. However, this price fixing
would only be proscribed if it substantially affects interstate commerce, if the
acts of the lawyers in following minimum
fee schedules fall within the "trade"
category," and if these acts are not excepted from Sherman Act liability under
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
The District concluded that interstate
commerce is sufficiently affected to sustain jurisdiction under the Sherman Act
since a significant portion of home
financing funds comes from withouHhe
State of Virginia and most of the lenders
require a title examination and title insurance. The Court further concluded
that the existence itself of a minimum fee
schedule places attorneys' services
within the "trade" category of the Act.
Parker v. Brown was analyzed to determine if the acts of the County of State
Bar would be excepted from Sherman
Act liability. In Parker, an agricultural
proration program for the raisin industry
was established by the state legislature to
insure stability in the marketing of state
agricultural commodities. The U. S.
Supreme Court held that the program
was permissible, even assuming that had
the program been adopted by private
individuals (i.e. no legislative mandate) it
would have violated the Sherman Act. In
other words, the Court stressed that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit state ac-

tion, only private action. In the present
case, the District Court found that the
State Bar is engaged in state action
under Parker for the following reasons:
the state legislature authorized the state
Supreme Court to regulate the conduct
of attorneys and the operation of the
state Bar; and the State Bar is statutority
required to investigate and discipline violators of the standards of conduct mandated by the state Supreme Court. The
County Bar, however, isa private undertaking. It does not derive any authority
or efficacy from the state. legislature or
the state Supreme Court. Bence, under
Park, the County Bar's actions are not
state actions. The County Bar's establishment of a minimum fee schedule is a
violation of the Sherman Act held the
Court; the State Bar's role as potential
enforcer of the County Bar's schedule is
not a violation. The Court gave another
season for freeing the State Bar from liability. The State Bar has only a minor
role in the fee schedule matter. It does
have judicial and legislative commands
to render opinions about and enforce
violations of ethical conduct; and it has in
effect stated in two opinions that it is unethical for an attorney to habitually
charge fees below its minimum fee
schedule, but the State Bar has never
disciplined an attorney for violating a
minimum fee schedule.
The County Bar and the Goldfarbs
appealed the District Court's decision
and these appeals were consolidated before the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit
agreed with the District Court that the
State Bar was immune from Sherman
Act liability under Parker. However, it
also found that the County Bar was immune based not on Parker. but on two
other factors: the "learned profession"
exemption from the, Sherman Act and
the lack of interstate commerce restraint.
The Fourth Circuit readily agreed that
" ... the fee schedule and the enforcement mechanism supporting it acts as a
substantial restraint upon competition
among attorneys practicing in Fairfax
County." Goldfarb, 497 F. 2d 1, 13
(1974). Yet the Court stated strongly
that the practice of a learned profession
is neither trade nor commerce; therefore
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restraints upon the practice of law are
not illegal per se. It held that the fee
schedules are valid insofar as their effect
is to restrain competition among attorneys.
Although the Fourth Circuit accepted
the District Court's findings of fact in reference to home financing and title
examinations, it reached a conclusion of
law opposite to that of the District Court.
Intersate commerce was held to be not
affected directly and substantially by the
activities of the County and State Bars
because law practice is considered an intrastate activity and borrowing purchase
money from an out-of-state lender
"", makes neither the selling of the house
nor the supplying of incidental legal services an interstate activity." Goldfarb,
497 F.2d 1, 17 (1974). Thus the impact
of minimum fee schedules upon interstate is merely incidental to the Bars'
intrastate activities.
The Goldfarbs appealed the Fourth
Circuit's decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court reiterated
that minimum fee schedules constitute
price fixing. Thus the Court was squarely
faced with the issue of whether the
minimum fee schedule for lawyers as
published by the County Bar and enforced by the State Bar violates the
Sherman Act.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit that
interstate commerce was not sufficiently
affected by the fee schedules was refuted
by the Supreme Court. The Court
pointed out that in a practical sense title
exams are a necessity in real estate
transactions, that indeed many purchase
loans are secured from-out-of-state lenders, and that a substantial volume of
commerce is involved. "Where, as a
matter of law or practical necessity, legal
services are an integral part of an interstate transaction, a restraint on those
services may substantially affect com-

merce for Sherman Act purposes."
Goldfarb, 43 L.W. 4723, 4727.
The Supreme Court dismissed the
Fourth Circuit's absolute statement that
the learned profeSSion is exempted from
Sherman Act liability by declaring that
the nature of the legal occupation along
does not provide sanctuary from the Act.
The Sherman Act attempts to prevent interstate restraints on commerce by
" ... every person engaged in business
whose activities might restrain or
monopolize commercial intercourse
among the States." u.s. v. Southeastem Underwriters Association, 322
U.S. 533, 553 (1944), cited in Goldfarb,
43 L. W. 4723, 4728. The practice of law
does have this business aspect, although
the Court in a footnote pointed out that
the fact that a restraint operates upon a
profession - as distinguished from a
business - is relevant in determining
Sherman Act liability.
Parker was cited by the Supreme
Court as support for its decision that the
County Bar's and the State Bar's activities are not exempted from Sherman
Act liability. The minimum fee schedules
were not authorized specifically by the
state legislature or the state Supreme
Court. Parker exemption occurs only
when anti-competitive conduct is "compelled by direction of the State acting as
a sovereign." Goldfarb, 43 L. W. 4723,
4729. The Court found that the State
Bar is a state agency for limited purposes
only and that when the State Bar established disciplinary measures for violators
of minimum fee schedules it was engaged in private anticompetitive activity.
The result of the decision in Goldfarb
is that minimum fee schedules established and enforced by bar associations
which restrain interstate commerce are
invalid under the Sherman Act. This decision will not affect the legal profession
drastically. Many state bar associations,
including Maryland's, have abandoned
these schedules; others never had fee
schedules. The distinction between the
business and the professional aspects of
the practice of law somewhat limits this
Sherman Act liability. The Supreme
Court specifically stated that the holding
that certain anticompetitive conduct by
lawyers results in Sherman Act liability is
not intended to diminish the state's au-

thority to regulate its profeSSions. Thus,
future decisions are necessary to determine whether other aspects of the practice of law, such as prohibitions against
advertiSing and solicitation, are within
the scope of the Sherman Act.

1975
Law Day
Project Honored
former Secretary of the Governor's
Commission on the Rights of the Handicapped completed the panel. Michael
Steinhardt, author of a definitive University of Baltimore Law Review article
on educational rights of the handicapped served ably as moderator of the
discussion.
Concepts and preparation were coordinated by Committee Chairperson Anthony Gallagher. The panel members
were informed in advance by the Chairperson of the questions to be presented,
ostensibly to avoid surprise or embarrassment. However, it was the interplay
created by the responses to these
queries that was designed to reveal important issues and problems that had not
been preViously aired.
The budget for the 1975 Project was
$450.00 of Student Bar Association
funds. However, the Chairperson was
able to elicit technical and broadcast
support from WBAL television's Community Affairs Director Sidney King and
none of the allocated monies were
utilized. The expenses of videotaping on
17 April, and broadcast on 1 May were
absorbed by WBAL.
Grateful appreciation is extended to
all who participated in the 1975 project.
Through their cooperation the desired
mass media impact was accomplished
and Law Day 1975 became a true community involvement experience. The
quality and success of the production is
evidenced by the First Place Award extended by the American Bar Association.
(Details ofthe 1976 Law Day Project will
be submitted for publication in the next
edition of THE FORUM.)

